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ABSTRACT 
 
A PHARMACEUTICALS PRICING PROBLEM 
 
Kolsarıcı , Şebnem 
M.A., Department of Economics 
Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Ümit Özlale 
 
 
September 2009 
 
Pharmaceuticals Market, both globally and in Turkey, is subject to a material 
tendency in curtailing health expenditures mainly through two instruments; generic 
drug utilization and policy changes regarding pricing and reimbursement. Although 
government agencies pay back ~90% of pharmaceuticals expenditures, as a result of 
policy changes and current market dynamics patients may face an out of pocket extra 
co-payment for brand-name drugs. In this challenging market, some important 
questions emerge regarding the extra co-payment such as how does demand change 
with the existence of an extra co-payment, how much do patients substitute to 
generics after facing extra co-payment, how do firms may set the prices optimally so 
manage the trade off between price and quantity sold. As the novelty of this thesis, 
we try to model the demand function through a simple application for an example 
drug, named Lipitor. According to the estimation for the demand function, we found 
that “extra co-payment” is a significant factor on the market share. The market share 
decreases with an increase in extra co-payment as patients do switch to generics. We 
also estimated the price elasticity. Then we solved the firm’s optimization problem 
which maximizes revenue subject to the firm’s only control variable, extra co-
payment. A core finding is that firms should not necessarily minimize or zero extra 
co-payment as they do not compensate that loss with the corresponding increase in 
the market share. Instead firms should optimize the extra co-payment.  
 
Key Words: Pharmaceuticals Market, Reimbursement, Pricing, Demand, Additional 
co-payment
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                                                              ÖZET 
İLAÇ SEKTÖRÜNDE BİR FİYATLANDIRMA PROBLEMİ 
 
Kolsarıcı, Şebnem 
Yüksek Lisans, Ekonomi Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Doç. Dr. Ümit Özlale 
 
Eylül 2009 
 
Dünyada olduğu gibi Türkiye ilaç sektöründe de sağlık harcamalarının kısılması 
yönünde ciddi bir eğilim mevcut. Sağlık harcamaları iki en önemli araçla azaltılmak 
isteniyor; eşdeğer ilaç kullanımının arttırılması ve fiyatlandırma ve geri ödeme 
politikası değişiklikleri. İlaç harcamalarının yaklaşık %90’ının devlet tarafından geri 
ödenmesine rağmen, değişen politikalar ve güncel Pazar dinamikleri neticesinde 
hastalar orijinal ilaçlar için ceplerinden ödedikleri ek hasta katkı payıyla 
karşılaşabiliyorlar. Bu zorlayıcı pazarda, ek hasta katkı payıyla ilgili “Talep, ek hasta 
katkı payıyla nasıl değişmektedir?”, “Hastalar ek hasta katkı payı nedeniyle eşdeğer 
ilaçlara ne kadar değişim yapmaktadırlar?”, “İlaç firmaları satış ünitesi ve fiyat 
arasındaki dengeyi göz önünde bulundurarak en uygun fiyatı nasıl belirleyebilir?” 
gibi bazı sorular öne çıkmaktadır. Bu tezde Lipitor isimli ilaç üzerinde talep 
eğrisinin tahmini yapmaya çalıştık. Talep eğrisi tahminine göre ek hasta katkı 
payının ilacın Pazar payı üzerinde belirgin etkili değişkenlerden biri olduğunu 
bulduk. Ek hasta katkı payı arttıkça hastalar reçetelerini eşdeğer ilaca değiştirmekte 
ve buna bağlı olarak Pazar payı düşmektedir.  Fiyat esnekliğini de tahmin ettik. 
Sonrasında ilaç şirketinin tek kontrol değişkeni olan fiyata göre gelir 
maksimizasyonu problemini çözdük. Önemli bulgumuz ise fiyattan kaybedilen geliri 
Pazar payındaki artışla telafi edemediklerinden şirketler ek hasta katkı payını 
azaltmamalıdırlar, bunun yerine geliri maksimize eden en uygun fiyatı tespit 
edebilirler.  
Anahtar Kelimeler: İlaç Pazarı, Geri ödeme, Fiyatlandırma, Talep, ek hasta katkı payi 
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                                              CHAPTER 1 
 
                                          INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
The pharmaceuticals industry which has a net value of $800 billion globally and a 
net value of $10 billion in Turkey, is a continuously growing industry with intense 
competition. Four major players in the Turkish pharmaceutical market can be 
identified. Of these, the first one is the payers constituting several government 
agencies which pay back 85% (Generic Drugs in Turkey, 2006: 6) of the market’s 
sales through various insurances despite having a restricted budget to a large extent. 
The second major player is the pharmaceutical companies which develop, produce 
and sell the drugs in the market. Wholesalers and pharmacies enable the distribution 
of drugs to the final player which is the patient. The largest buyer is different than 
the consumer in the pharmaceuticals market. The buyer – Government- also has a 
great role in the market conditions such as competition and all drug prices. The two 
facts that the biggest customer, the government, is no consumer at all and that the 
biggest customer sets the market conditions alone, make the economic dynamics 
appealing in terms of modeling. 
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 The recent changes in the market dynamics and which will likely to continue in the 
following years, mainly the increasing trend in patent losses in the world, the 
declining trend in the number of new product launches, the fact that payers now 
require better evidence for new products, increasing safety issues, made competition 
more important than ever.  
 
While the pharmaceuticals industry keeps growing all over the world and the 
competition in pharmaceuticals market increases; public payers suffering from 
increasing health and pharmaceutical expenditures leads the social security 
institutions to face bottlenecks. Consequently, national and international 
pharmaceutical policies started to change, the role of generic pharmaceutical 
applications and activities in parallel trade become more significant and pricing and 
the reimbursement policies become even more important all over the world.  
 
Similarly, in Turkey, from the public payer’s point of view, in parallel with the 
increase in health expenditures, expenditures on pharmaceuticals have an increasing 
trend as well and it reached nearly 22% of health care costs (Generic Drugs in 
Turkey, 2006). This increasing trend has resulted in an attempt to constraint budget, 
to take saving measures and put the pharmaceutical expenditures under control in 
recent years using two major instruments; reference pricing and generic drug 
utilization.  
 
On the other hand, the increase in the generic drugs use made brand-name drug firms 
suffer. In Turkey the patent law is late and protects the drugs only after 1999. 
Therefore many drugs, which have patent protection in the world, already have 
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generics in Turkey from the beginning of their sales. Besides the late patent law, 
considering the increasing trend towards generic drugs, which are less costly for the 
payer, made the situation more difficult for original drug firms. The competition 
between brand-name drugs and generics play an important role for firms, aiming to 
pursue a profitable growth.  
 
Under the influence of the pricing system, patients face extra co-pay in the 
pharmacies. Although most of the drug costs are afforded by the insurers, as a result 
of the current pricing system the brand-name drugs may cost the consumers an out-
of-pocket amount, which is called as “extra co-pay”. What we observe in real life is 
that consumers with a branded-drug prescription are likely to substitute generics at 
the purchase moment at the pharmacy, in order to avoid the “extra co-pay”. Given 
the power of pharmacists to assist consumers in generic drug substitution in case of 
an out-of-pocket payment, interesting questions emerge such as how much the 
consumers do substitute, how important the price elasticity is and how the consumer 
choices can be modeled.  
 
Reference pricing is the key part of the regulatory environment in the Turkish 
Pharmaceuticals market. In the scope of the reference pricing application, the 
originator product can take up to 100% of the reference price and for generic 
medicines the ceiling price is set at 80% of the reference price. Whereas the 
Reference price is determined according to the lowest ex-factory price of the brand-
name product among the selected 5 EU-members reference countries. Below the 
reference price, companies are free to set their own price for each drug. As we know 
that some consumers are reluctant to pay out-of-pocket if the extra co-pay amount is 
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high and that they switch to generics, then there is a trade off for the firms between 
market share and price. Firms can keep the price high and so keep the marginal 
utility higher per product but lose sales units as a result of the extra co-pay for 
customers. How should the company set the price optimally? Should extra co-pay be 
kept for maximum revenue or should it be minimized? Considering the fact that 
patent losses will keep increasing in the following years and generic drug utilization 
is encouraged by government for cutting health expenditures, the importance of the 
question is better realized for the brand-name companies.   
 
Although reference pricing and the reimbursement policy is subject to an important 
debate in Turkey since its introduction in 2004, no studies have dealt empirically 
with the impact of the pricing and reimbursement system on the Turkish drug 
market, the switching behavior, consumer choice or firm’s pricing strategy in terms 
of competition.  
 
In this study, we try to fulfill this gap with the use of a simple application. We try to 
model the demand function of an example drug, Lipitor, which has “extra co-pay”, 
using the observations in the last years. We estimate the price elasticity and then 
solve the firm’s optimization problem which maximizes revenue subject to the 
firm’s only control variable, extra co-pay.  
 
 
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. In chapter 2 we provide general 
information in the Pharmaceutical Market both globally and in Turkey and the 
current Turkish pricing system. Chapter 3 reviews the related literature on 
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Pharmaceuticals Pricing and Reimbursement policies. Chapter 4 provides a detailed 
description of the data, followed by the modeling approach and empirical analysis in 
chapter 5 and chapter 6. Chapter 7 explains the findings of the analysis. Finally 
Chapter 8 contains a summary and the conclusion from our study. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
PHARMACEUTICALS MARKET 
 
2.1. Global Pharmaceuticals Market  
 
The pharmaceuticals having a net value of $800 billion globally is a continuously 
growing industry; however the growth rate declines in recent years and likely to 
continue declining in the following years as a result of changes in the market 
dynamics. Figure 1 shows the market size and growth between 2004 and 2008.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: IMS Health, Market Prognosis International, Sep 2007 
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Figure 1: The Global Pharmaceuticals Market Size and Growth 
7 
 
Of the World Pharmaceutical Market, North America and Europe account for 40.3% 
and 32% respectively. The rest of the market is Asia/Africa/Australia with 11.8%, 
Japan with 9.9% and Latin America with 6% market share1. On the other hand, the 
contributions of the biggest Pharmaceutical markets, which are U.S. and Europe, to 
the growth of the global market declined from 68% in 2002 to 47% in 2008.2 
Whereas the contributions of Japan and so-called “Pharmerging” markets which are 
China, India, Brazil, Russia, Mexico, Turkey and S. Korea to growth increase 32% 
to 50% (IMS Health, Market Prognosis, 2007). Being one of the still growing 
“Pharmerging” markets, Turkey becomes critically important in the global 
pharmaceutical market. 
 
Main changes giving way to the market dynamics globally are;  
• the increase in genericization 
• the increase in Patent losses 
• the decrease in new product launches  
• payers’ attempts to cut health expenditures through policy changes in terms of 
reimbursement and reference pricing 
• new safety issues 
 
Figure 2 below presents the increase in patent losses from years 2002 to 2012. 
Generic drugs are emerging immediately after patent of the brand-name drug expires 
with a more economic price.  
 
                                                 
1 http://www.ieis.org.tr/ 
2 IMS Health, Market Prognosis, September 2007 
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Source: IMS Health, MIDAS, New Market Segmentation, MAT Jun 2007 
 
Besides, the patent losses are not compensated by new product launches. Figure 3 
depicts the declination of the product launches. The reason why is that it gets harder 
to find a blockbuster molecule after billions of dollars clinical researches. Moreover 
payers now require better evidence for authorization of new products and for 
reimbursement due to the budget constraints. Therefore firms become more reluctant 
to spare money for discovering new products in this environment; instead they do 
invest in sales and marketing which makes competition more intense than before. 
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Source: IMS R&D Focus; Market Insights, Oct 2007 
 
Another important change shaping the challenging market dynamics is that payers 
now require better evidence for authorization and reimbursement. A few examples 
from all over the world that it is now more difficult to convince government for new 
products are listed as follows; 
• NICE refuses coverage for RA drug  
• NICE refuses coverage of anti-dementia drugs for NHS patients with newly 
diagnosed mild Alzheimer’s  
• Manufacturers in UK and France move to payment by results agreements for 
specific drugs where reimbursement is at issue 
• CMS informs hospitals and physicians that future payment increases will be 
linked to improvements in clinical performance 
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• Continued expansion of reference pricing schemes in Germany, Italy and Spain 
demonstrate government is not differentiating value among therapy classes 
 
Increasing safety issues are also an important change giving way to market dynamics 
globally.  
 
2.2. Pharmaceuticals Market Turkey 
 
Being one of Pharma emerging – so called “Pharmerging” markets, Turkey is a still 
growing and the 13th biggest Pharmaceuticals Market in the world.   
The Turkish prescribed pharmaceutical market has reached 6,35 billion Euro and 
1,38 billion units by volume in 2008. The growth rate of the market in terms of € is 
2,2% and %5 by volume.3  
 
Figure 4: The Size of Turkish Pharmaceutical Market after Foam 
 
                                                 
3 http://www.ieis.org.tr/asp_pages/index.asp?sayfa=215&menuk=12 
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Figure 4 represents the real market size of Turkish Pharmaceuticals after discounts 
and free goods. Figure 5 shows the significant growth of the market between years 
2001 to 2007 and the expected market size in 2012. The Turkish Pharmaceuticals is 
expected to be a 12 billion dollars market by 2012. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: The Size and Growth of Turkish Pharmaceutical Market 
 
Similar to the trend worldwide, in this growing market in Turkey, new products 
constitute less in size. The number of new product launches and their declining 
contribution to the market are presented in Figure 6, Figure 7 and Table 1.   
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                          Table 1: Sales in Launch Year and Launch performance 
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Contribution to 
market 3,1% 4,2% 1,6% 2,7% 1,9% 1,3% 
Ave. Price ($) 0,59 0,76 0,46 0,34 0,57 0,61 
 
 
Figure 8  and Table 2 are presenting the market in terms of generic and original 
drugs.  
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Table 2: Originals vs. Generics in the market in terms of value and Sales Unit 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Original $ 67% 65% 63% 62% 65% 65% 
Generic $ 33% 35% 37% 38% 35% 35% 
Original SU 57% 56% 55% 54% 54% 54% 
Generic SU 43% 44% 45% 46% 46% 46% 
 
2.3. Pricing and Reimbursement Policies in Turkey  
2.3.1. Basic Notions 
 
Patent: Patent is a document that grants an inventor the right to exploit an invention 
for a given period of time. During this period the inventor has the right to produce, 
use and sell the invention without competition as the patent excludes others from 
making, using and selling the invention. In Turkey patent protection came into force 
in 1999. With the patent law, the products are covered with patent for 20 years. For 
products launched before 1999 in Turkish Pharmaceuticals Market, there exists no 
patent production.  
 
Reference Drug: “A reference drug is the product that is licensed and marketed for 
the first time in the world”.4 “Branded drug” or “original product” can also be used 
instead of “reference drug”. World Depending on a number of considerations, a 
company may apply for and be granted a patent for the drug, or the process of 
producing the drug, granting exclusivity rights typically for about 20 years. 
                                                 
4 http://www.esdegerilac.com/asp_pages/index.asp 
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However, only after rigorous study and testing, which takes 10 to 15 years on 
average, will governmental authorities grant permission for the company to market 
and sell the drug. Patent protection enables the owner of the patent to recover the 
costs of research and development through high profit margins for the branded drug. 
 
Generic Drug: It is an equivalent of the reference drug. A generic drug is a drug 
which is produced and distributed without patent protection. The generic drug may 
still have a patent on the formulation but not on the active ingredient. It contains the 
same active substance with the reference product and is marketed after the extension 
of the protection period. When the patent protection for the drug expires, a generic 
drug is usually developed and sold by a competing company. It provides the same 
quality, safety and efficacy as the reference product, yet is more economically 
priced. Generic products do not repeat the pre-clinical tests and clinical trials 
performed by the reference drug producer. Instead, they do bioequivalence tests. 
Since generics do not repeat the pre-clinical and clinical tests, they are more 
economically priced than the reference products. In other words, the development 
and approval of generics is less expensive, allowing them to be sold at a lower price. 
Often the owner of the branded drug will introduce a generic version before the 
patent expires in order to get a head start in the generic market. A generic must 
contain the same active ingredients as the original formulation. Generics are 
identical in dose, strength, route of administration, safety, efficacy, and intended use. 
In most cases, generic products are available once the patent protections afforded to 
the original developer have expired. When generic products become available, the 
market competition often leads to substantially lower prices for both the original 
brand name product and the generic forms. The time it takes a generic drug to appear 
16 
 
on the market varies. In Turkey and in US, drug patents give twenty years of 
protection, but they are applied for before clinical trials begin, so the effective life of 
a drug patent tends to be between seven and twelve years. 
 
2.3.2. Pricing 
 
Reference price: The reference price of a licensed brand-name drug is the minimum 
of discounts excluded manufacturer’s prices (lowest ex-factory price); among the 
reference countries and the countries that the branded drug is produced and 
imported.   
 
Reference countries: The reference countries are 5 EU member countries, France, 
Italy, Portugal, Spain and Greece until the end of 2007 and 2008, but the reference 
countries may change and the number of reference countries may increase up to 10, 
provided that prior notification is given before 4 months. 
 
Pharmaceutical Pricing: The retail prices of pharmaceuticals are calculated by 
adding %8 VAT and the wholesaler and pharmacist mark-ups to the ex-factory price.  
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Table 3: Pricing of Pharmaceuticals; Original and Generic Products 
 
Original Products 
Reference Price 
+ 
Wholesaler and pharmacist 
mark-up 
+ 
8% VAT 
  
 
 
  
 
Generic Products 
80% of the Reference Price 
+ 
Wholesaler and pharmacist 
mark-up 
+ 
8% VAT 
 
 
Table 4: Wholesaler and Pharmacist Mark-ups 
of the wholesaler 
sales price Wholesaler (%) Pharmacist (%) 
Up to YTL 10 9 25 
YTL 10 – 50 8 25 
YTL 51 – 100 7 25 
YTL 101 – 200 4 16 
Over YTL 200 2 12 
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The General Directorate of Pharmaceuticals and Pharmacies (IEGM), which is part 
of the Ministry of Health, regulates and controls the Pharmaceutical prices in 
Turkey. “In the framework of the decree on the pricing of medicinal products for 
human use dated 30.06.2007 and numbered 2007/12325, the reference price of an 
original product is determined according to the lowest ex-factory price among 5 EU 
member countries which are France, Spain, Italy, Portugal and Greece until the end 
of 2007 and 2008, but the reference countries may change and the number of 
reference countries may increase up to 10, provided that prior notification is given 
before 4 months”.5 The prices of brand and generic drugs are determined by “the 
reference pricing method” and published in the IEGM web page.  and stand for an 
explanation of the pricing system in the Turkish regulatory environment based on the 
reference price. According to the reference pricing, the price of a brand-name drug is 
allowed to be less than or equal to 100% of the reference price, whereas the price of 
a generic is allowed to be less than or equal to 80% of the reference price. For 
products more than twenty years old, reference pricing method is not applied. Below 
the ceiling price determined by the reference pricing, companies are free to 
determine the price of their own products. 
 
2.3.3. Reimbursement Policy Turkey 
 
In its broadest meaning, reimbursement is the payment of the whole or some part of 
the price of medical product or health care to the person/patient or to the institution 
that provided the service by insurance institution.  
                                                 
5 http://www.ieis.org.tr/asp_pages/index.asp?sayfa=235&menuk=12 
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Within the framework of social security reform, a range of reimbursement policies 
have been followed since 2004. The Ministry of Labour and Social Security have 
been working on a new structure for the social security and the general health 
insurance system covering the whole population since 2004. Until May 2006, 
Turkey's social security system comprised three separate institutions which were 
Bağ-Kur, for self-employed workers and farmers; SSK, for private and public sector 
workers and Emekli Sandigi (ES) for the civil servants. For more than ten years, the 
system has been running deficits in spite of the very favorable demographics. These 
deficits have required increasingly large transfers from the general government 
budget, prompting several reform attempts. As a result, in the context of Social 
Security Reform, three public social security institutions were united under a new 
single body (Social Security Institution) in the second half of 2006. 
 
Discussions on Social Security Reform are still going on. Two decrees on 
reimbursement for different layers of the population entered into force on 15 June 
2007. Two positive lists, one covering green card holders, civil servants, military 
staff and the other covering self-employed workers and farmers, private and public 
sector workers and retired civil servants entered into force on 22 June 2007. 
 
 The reimbursement system is governed by the Reimbursement Commission, which 
is formed by officials representing the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Finance and 
Social Security Institution.  
 
In the scope of reimbursement, medicines are reimbursed up to %22 above the 
cheapest medicine in the generic medicine list. Generic medicine concept started 
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with 77 active materials in 2005 and this number was expanded to 333 within the 
year. This number has reached 425 in 2008.6 
 
Pharmacy discount rates in public medicine purchasing are determined by taking 
into account pharmacy sales revenue (VAT excluded). See Table 5 for pharmacist 
discount rates in regards to sales revenue. Table 6 presents importer and 
manufacturer discount rates. 
                                                 Table 5:Pharmacist Discounts 
Pharmacist discount related to annual sales revenue 
2007 (VAT excluded)  
% 
Pharmacies up to 350.000 TL % 0 
Pharmacies between 350.000 TL – 600.000 TL % 1,0 
Pharmacies between 600.000 TL – 900.000 TL % 1,5 
Pharmacies over than 900.000 TL % 2,5 
                                  Table 6: Importer and manufacturer discount rates 
For generic and reference products over 6 year from 
registration date 
% 11,0 
For reference products less than 6 year from registration 
date 
% 4,0 
 
Extra Co-Pay: As the medicines are reimbursed up to 22% above the cheapest 
medicine in the generic medicine list, a drug is fully reimbursed only if the price is 
                                                 
6 http://www.ieis.org.tr/asp_pages/index.asp?sayfa=245&menuk=12 
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less than the band which equals 1,22 times the price of the cheapest generic. If the 
price of a drug is not inside the reimbursement band of 22%, the excess amount over 
the band is paid by patients out of pocket, which is what we call “extra co-pay”. This 
is called “band system of 22%”. 
 
The patients generally pay a 20% or a 10% of the price of the medicine out of pocket 
depending on their health insurance type (Emekli Sandığı, SSK or Bağ-kur). When 
the price of a drug is greater than the price that is reimbursed by SGK which was 
calculated through reference pricing method, the incremental part is paid directly by 
the patients. The amount that the patient pays over the natural 10% or 20% co-pay is 
what we call “extra co-pay”.  
 
Switch in the Pharmacy: Regardless of the doctor’s recommendation and the 
medicine on the prescription, in Turkey pharmacist has the right to switch the 
medicine on a prescription with any of the generics. Therefore the patient can choose 
to buy a generic drug if he/she chooses not to pay extra co-pay. He has an 
alternative. In Turkey generic drugs usage is encouraged also by government due to 
economic reasons. In addition generics are usually more profitable for the 
pharmacists as they generally apply free goods and trade discounts. These are also 
some factors that make pharmacists tend to switch the original drug on a prescription 
to a more profitable generic.  
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                                                         CHAPTER 3 
 
RELATED LITERATURE 
 
 
There is a dense literature in pharmaceuticals economics examining the 
pharmaceutical pricing and the reimbursement policies globally. However, very few 
studies focus empirically on the impact of reference pricing on the drug market or 
switching behavior. 
 
An example is Docteur et al (2008). She studied pharmaceutical pricing policies in 
the global market and presented information about pharmaceutical industry in terms 
of drug prices and government policies. Similarly, Vogler et al (2009) presented 
relevant pharmaceutical pricing and reimbursement information in a comparative 
analysis for twenty eight countries and also described the Spanish pricing and 
reimbursement system in details. 
 
Strategic Overview of Pharmaceutical Pricing and Reimbursement in the Major 
Markets (2009) is another study on the performance of branded drugs under the 
influence of changes in the healthcare systems and the growing role of payers in 
some major markets; United States, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, United Kingdom 
and Japan. While economic concerns are prompting waves of changes and payers are 
increasingly balking at healthcare costs and seeking ways to contain expenditures.  
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The article is a talk on the major market authorities deploying various reforms and 
policies in different ways due to cost-consciousness in common. In parallel with the 
other literature, it is also underlined that the use of lower priced generics is a well-
established cost-containment measure. The ways that countries are prompting 
increased use of generics and the effects of generics on the sales of branded 
pharmaceuticals are explained in detail for seven major markets. Moreover, in such a 
cost-conscious environment, the article gives information about the key pricing 
trends in the major markets and the ways to set and adjust prices, the strategies of 
healthcare authorities and pharmaceutical companies use in pricing negotiations.    
 
Pharmaceutical Pricing and Reimbursement in China (2009) is a similar study on 
Chinese pharmaceutical market which is said to become the third largest in the world 
in 2011 with a growth rate of more than 20% per year. A radical healthcare reform 
package recently unveiled by the government that will more than double public 
healthcare expenditures from 2009 to 2011. The paper highlights that the 
performance of biopharmaceutical companies competing in China will significantly 
depend on the clear understanding of the implications of these reforms. The article is 
elaborating the most important government sponsored public health insurance 
programs comparatively and the role of hospitals as the most dominant distribution 
channel for prescription drugs in China. According to the paper, prices for 
international branded drugs in China are generally comparable to prices in some 
European markets. Chinese prices are compared to U.S. prices as a part of the study. 
The article gives a debate on the future pharmaceuticals applications. For example a 
drug’s reimbursement prospects are likely to depend heavily on inclusion in a new 
national essential medicines list in the future. The paper talks on how extensive will 
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the list likely to be and how will the healthcare system procure and use drugs on this 
list.  
 
Different than the above literature, Custom Decision Support, Inc. (2004) is a study 
on pharmaceutical pricing and it approaches the pricing problem from the firm’s 
point of view which has the goal of maximizing the long-term earnings. The main 
motivation of this paper also is the increase in the healthcare costs which is much 
faster than the economy in general and as a result of this growth healthcare insurers 
being increasingly aggressive in curtailing costs. Considering this trend the 
regulators and the Government are likely to get involved sooner or later. This made 
the optimum pricing policies of firms more important. The existence of competitors, 
multiple products and segments makes the firm’s optimization problem complex. 
The study tries to understand the likely impact of market changes and to provide 
some type of “optimum” pricing policy. The core issue for obtaining an analytical 
view of pricing was of course customer demand. The reason why it is a problem to 
find the answer of the question of how much of a product would the “customer” 
purchase against a set of competing products at various prices, is in pharmaceuticals 
there are several individuals involved in the specification, selection, use, and 
payment of the product. In order to handle this difficulty, various purchase processes 
are divided into three groups; direct purchases (i.e. the drugs not covered by the 
insurers), hospital purchases, and outpatient purchases (i.e. obtaining ethical drugs 
by patients and paid by an insurer with co-pay by the patient). For each, a different 
model with different measures of customer demand is needed. For the simplest case, 
direct purchases, only focus is on customer. For outpatient purchases, it is needed to 
capture the competitive price sensitivity of the decision makers in setting the 
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formulary and on co-pay structure, sensitivity of the physicians to the formulary 
ranking and co-pay structure, and finally the co-pay price sensitivity of the patients.  
 
Instead of a linear form, an S-shaped demand curve is used to estimate the optimum 
prices which depend on the knowledge of product price sensitivity that is, how 
market share or sales volume depend on price and the firm’s problem is solved 
accordingly for direct purchases. The study also gives a general idea and lists the 
main principles for optimum pricing policy for firms.  
 
Stargardt (2009) studied the impact of reference pricing in switching behavior in the 
German statin market empirically. Monitoring the patients with prescriptions for 
statins for one year long after the inclusion of reference pricing, in January 2005, he 
investigated the effect of the policy change on the patients’ choices on different 
drugs under the influence of additional co-payments. He employed a logistic 
regression model to measure the effect on the patient’s choice. He found that the 
predicted probability to switch from atorvastatin to another statin was 0.88 for the 
average patient, patients from all income groups were clearly affected by the policy 
change.  
 
Rizzo and Zeckhauser (2009) employed a logarithmic regression model to examine 
how the mix of consumer choices between generic and brand-name drugs might 
affect the average price of those brand-name drugs that are purchased which is an 
area that the prior literature was silent. The motivation of the study is also the 
increasing pharmaceuticals expenditure in recent decades and the rise in generic 
drug utilization (i.e. from 19% of scripts in 1984 to 47% in 2001, thus compensating 
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the growth in health expenditures through significant direct dollar savings. Using a 
nationally representative panel of data on drug utilization and costs for the years 
1996-2001, he found that higher share of an individual’s prescriptions filled by 
generics results a lower average brand-name price to consumers, because consumers 
are more likely to substitute generics when brand-name drugs would cost them more. 
The substantial effect is that a 10% increase in consumer’s generic script share is 
associated with a 15.6% decline in the average price paid for brand-name drugs by 
consumers. Although the prior work indicated that brand-name producers do not 
lower their prices in the face of generic competition, the firms lower prices as a 
result of consumer choices valuing the cost savings from generic purchases more 
than any perceived quality premiums offered by brand-name drugs. 
 
Reference pricing and the reimbursement policy is subject to an important debate 
also in Turkey since its introduction in 2004. Surprisingly no studies have dealt 
empirically with the impact of the pricing and reimbursement system on the Turkish 
drug market, consumer choice and the switching behavior or firm’s pricing strategy 
in terms of competition. This thesis tries to fulfill this gap. 
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                                              CHAPTER 4 
 
                                               DATA 
 
 
In order to investigate the optimal price for a branded drug in the Turkish 
pharmaceutical market under the existence of an “extra co-pay” possibility for the 
patient, we employ a national data set of a cholesterol reducing drug, Lipitor. The 
reason of choosing Lipitor in the analysis is mainly based on the fact that the brand 
suffers from intensive generic competition (i.e. 14) and high extra co-pay amounts 
(i.e. going up to 11 TL), both of which makes Lipitor possibly one of the best 
candidates for being switched for generic drugs. 
 
Lipitor, a blockbuster cholesterol-lowering medication marketed by Pfizer, is the 
largest-selling drug in the world with 2006 sales of US$12.9 billion. With annual 
sales of ~$13 billion, it sells more than twice as much as its closest competitor. In 
Turkey, Lipitor sells ~70 million TL annually under intense generic competition 
different than the world7. Lipitor has been introduced in the Turkish market under 8 
different forms: combinations of 4 types of dosages (i.e. 10, 20, 40 and 80 
milligrams) and 2 types of tablet numbers (30 and 90).  
 
                                                 
7 IMS Health, Sales 2009 
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The data set includes monthly information on sales of all forms of Atorvastatin 
molecules (Lipitor and all its generic competitors) for the period September, 2005-
July, 2009, a total of 47 observations. Figure 9 depicts unit sales for different drug 
forms. Reflecting sales in MAT, using a moving average of twelve months period of 
sales, enabled us to eliminate fluctuations and see the trend better.  
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Figure 9: Lipitor Sales (TL) from 2005 to 2009(MAT) 
 
 
The source of the sales data set is IMS, which is a global company functioning in 
more than 100 countries and provides reliable data about Pharmaceutical Market. 
The IMS sales data audit, Turkey Pharmaceutical Index (TPI) is the definitive 
measure of ethical product sales from the wholesalers to the retail pharmacies in 
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Turkey. IMS covers 99% of the pharmacies in Turkish Market and presents the most 
accurate daily data in company, brand and form detail.  
 
Atorvastatin market size changes from a month to another and grows in time, as 
shown in Figure 10. The change in the market size may lead misreading the 
performance of drugs. Moreover different tablet forms tend to follow different 
trends, for example 90 tab forms tend to grow whereas 30 tab forms tend to lessen in 
time8  
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Figure 10: Atorvastatin Market Size (TL) from 2005 to 2009(MAT) 
 
An important part of our data set is the “extra co-pay” of Lipitor, which is the 
amount that the patients afford out of pocket, for the portion which is over the 
                                                 
8 IMS Sales, 2009 
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reimbursed price. For 8 forms of Lipitor, we use the extra co-pay amounts at each 
month from September 2005 to July 2009. The amount of extra co-pay may change 
with the arrival of a new generic in the market or when the price of the cheapest 
generic changes. The changes in the band system, price changes in the reference 
countries or in the reimbursement policy of the government or the company’s 
decision to keep or decrease extra co-pay may reason with a change in the amount of 
extra co-pay. When a new generic arrive at the market, the extra co-pay amount rises 
as the price of the cheapest generic decrease (The reimbursed amount was 122% of 
the cheapest generic). Then tracking the sales of the product, at some point the firm 
may decide to lower or zero it and increase sales unit; or may decide to keep the 
additional co-pay. In the timeline we work on, the extra co-pay amount may vary or 
remain unchanged from one period to another.  
 
The extra co-pay amounts are calculated according to the drug prices which are all 
available in the web site of Ministry of Health. Using the current band system 
information and the price of the cheapest generic at period t, extra co-pay amounts 
are calculated. If the extra co-pay amount has changed in a month once or more, we 
calculated the average for that month.  
 
The market share of the product is undoubtedly related with the number of 
competitors in the market. Thus, the “Number of generics” in a period of sales is 
also included in our data set. In the time period we model, the number of generics 
increased from 5 to 14. The data of the “number of generics” are also based on IMS 
sales. Similar to the “extra co-pay”, we calculated the presence of a generic in the 
market in a month on average in case the generic comes out inside the month.  
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There are, of course, many other factors that may affect the market share of a drug. 
The price, the campaigns, the competitor moves, performance of the molecule, 
technologic improvements, health sector dynamics, reimbursement policies, changes 
in the field force are only a few of these. There should be no missing variable bias to 
estimate the demand curve of Lipitor and the data set should be sufficient to explain 
our dependent variable “Market Share”. On the other hand employing excess 
independent variables may complicate the model.   
 
Of these, sales campaigns are another factor that may affect the performance of a 
drug. We also investigated the campaigns in the Atorvastatin market. Hence, the 
monthly campaigns are not widely applicable in this market. Instead the campaigns 
such as given free goods are generally like constant sales terms of competitors so 
that sales do not deviate from one month to another under the influence of 
campaigns. Lipitor also does not make sales campaign nor gives free goods; instead 
it applies a constant standard sales term. That is why we did not employ sales 
campaigns in the model.  
 
Advertising may be treated as another factor on the performance of a drug in the 
world, yet it is not allowed in Turkey. Drugs are marketed only through detailing to 
doctors in Turkey. Therefore the “field force”, the number of sales agents studying 
Lipitor in the field, is also included to our data set to investigate the effect of the 
detailing on sales performance. Hence, we saw that “field force” is not a significant 
factor in the performance of Lipitor in terms of market share. Yet, it is significant 
when we take the dependent variable as “sales unit”. It can be interpreted that for 
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Lipitor, the changes in the field force may take place in parallel with the changes in 
the market size. Plus, the changes in the field force may be parallel with the field 
forces of competitors. So, these parallel changes may offset each other as we study 
the effects on “Market Share”. That’s why we do not employ field force to our 
model. 
 
To sum up, we employed a set of data to understand the behavior of the market share 
of Lipitor with respect to the changes in two important factors; “extra co-pay” which 
is the amount afforded by patients out of pocket and “the number of generics” in the 
market. See APPENDIX 2 for summary statistics. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
MODELING FRAMEWORK 
 
 
Our study first employed a multiple linear regression model with two independent 
variables. Market Share, MS, is the dependent variable, whereas extra co-pay, the 
number of generics in the market, X1 and X2 are the explanatory variables. The term, 
ε, is a random disturbance, which is assumed to be normally distributed with zero 
mean and constant variance. 
 
Demand equation ? MS  = β0 + β1*X1 + β2*X2 +…+ ε 9 
The observed values of market share are; 
msi,j  = β0 + β1*x1,i,,j + β2*x2,i,j +…+ εi,j 
 
As the dependent variable, we used “Market Share” instead of “Unit Sales” in order 
to eliminate the effect of the changes regarding the market trends. Using the monthly  
 
IMS unit sales of all Atorvastatin molecules; the “monthly unit market share of 
Lipitor” is calculated for the observation period, from September 2005 to June 2009.  
                                                 
9 The dependent variable, Market Share, changes between 0 and 1 whereas the independent variables 
take values between 0 and ∞. Mathematically the function for market share could be mapped into 
another function whose range is also between 0 and ∞. But here in our study that transformation 
would not affect our model results with the current data set.   
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Using the sales unit of Lipitor and all other generics in Atorvastatin market, the 
monthly unit market share of Lipitor is defined as follows; 
 
MSi,j,t=Lipitor SUi,j,t / ∑ Atorvastatin SUi,j,t ? i forms, j milligrams, at period t. 
 
Instead of daily frequency, using a monthly frequency in the model enabled us to see 
the most accurate results as the targets of the field force in the Pharmaceuticals 
industry are given on a monthly base. The sales may vary from day to day for 
various reasons. For example on Saturdays the sales are approximately one forth of 
weekdays and on Saturdays there is no considerable sale. Monthly frequency gives 
the best idea on the performance of a product in the Pharmaceutical Market. In other 
words, using a monthly frequency saved the model from high frequency problems. 
 
The three independent variables which we employ in our model are the “monthly 
extra co-pay on average” and the “monthly number of generics on average in the 
market”. 
 
Before employing a multiple linear regression model, we have to question our data 
set in terms of the validity of the assumptions the Classical Linear Regression 
Model, which depend heavily on the assumption of independence. According to 
those, the model searches for a linear relationship with a number of observations 
which we know that has a full rank. We also assume the exogeneity of the regressors 
and the exogenous data generation. It is also necessary to show the disturbance is 
homoscedastic and nonautocorrelated before using a multiple linear regression 
model. 
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See Appendix 3 for the assumptions of the Classical Linear Regression Model. 
5.1. Assumptions regarding Demand and Supply Curves 
In this thesis we mainly try to estimate the demand curve depicting the relationship 
between the price of a certain product and the amount of it that consumers are 
willing and able to purchase at that given price. In microeconomic theory, demand is 
defined as the willingness and ability of a consumer to purchase a given product in a 
given frame of time. 
The demand curve for all consumers together is composed of the aggregation of 
demand curve of every individual consumer: the individual demands at each price 
are added together. Some consumers are ready to pay the extra co-pay whereas some 
prefer to substitute to generics.  
Main assumptions that this thesis is based on regarding the demand and supply 
curves are as follows:  
? Our observations at each period are on the demand curve 
? The observations are not necessarily on the equilibrium levels 
? Demand curve does not shift in the time period we study 
? Supply curve is perfectly elastic 
? There exist no shifts in supply in the time period we study 
The reasons for the above assumptions depend heavily on the market dynamics that 
we observe. First of all we assume that when the extra co-pay amount changes the 
quantity demanded changes accordingly through a movement along the demand 
curve. From the point of microeconomics it is important to distinguish between 
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movement along the demand curve, and a shift in the demand curve. A shift would 
result in a new demand curve. The reason why we assume that no shift takes place in 
the demand curve is that there is no change in the relationship between quantity and 
price that is brought about by a change in any of the factors influencing demand 
except price. The main factors that may shift the demand curve which we assume to 
remain unchanged for our observation time period are the income level of the 
patients, the treatment preferences, the penetration of cholesterol disease, the prices 
of substitutes and complements, changes in population etc.  
Another assumption is that the observations each period, price and market share 
pairs are on the demand curve depicting the changes in the choices of patients under 
the influence of out of pocket extra co-payment levels. As we want to find the 
optimum price for the firm which maximizes the revenue, the observations are not 
necessarily on the equilibrium levels, but points move along the demand curve.  
A change in supply also affects the price and quantity of the product. It is also 
assumed that there is no shift in supply curve. The factors that would shift the supply 
curve are mainly the rises (or falls) in the prices of productive resources, changes in 
technology, changes in cost of production, etc. In this thesis the changes in these 
factors are assumed to be negligible. The efficiency improvements may take place 
since 2005; however these improvements in production costs are calculated not to be 
significant in shifting supply curve for our analysis.    
Another assumption in this model is that supply is perfectly elastic that the firm 
produces the demanded amount of products at each price level that the supply curve 
is a horizontal line. The changes in extra co-pay do not affect the firms’ production 
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decisions; instead firms meet the demand at each price level. Perfectly elastic supply 
occurs, in theory, when sellers are able to switch resources among a large number of 
perfect substitutes-in-production.  
Through our study we fare forth with these assumptions which are undoubtedly 
subject to discussion. Considering the market dynamics and observations in real life 
regarding firms and patients the assumptions seem rational. We leave the study of 
challenging each assumption for future work.  
 
5.2 Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Tests 
 
The interpretation of the results of a classical regression analysis, depend heavily on 
the homoscedasticity and nonautocorrelation of the disturbances. Thus, 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation tests are applied to ensure the efficiency of the 
OLS estimator. Moreover, it is necessary to make sure the response and the predictor 
variables are stationary and do not have a trend. For that we applied the Unit Root 
Tests.  
 
We mainly analyzed the residual plots, checked the correlation matrix between the 
predictor variables and performed the necessary autocorrelation, heteroscedasticity 
and unit root tests in order to investigate if there is a trend in the data or relation 
between disturbances. See Appendix 1 for Plot of Residuals to detect the existence 
of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation.  
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First of all, to investigate a possible multicollinearity, we check the correlation 
between two explanatory variables. If there were a model specification error, an 
omitted variable bias, the independent variables would move parallel under the 
influence of another significant but missing variable. Here in the Table 7 below, the 
correlation between predictor variables are available.  
                              
                              Table 7: Correlation between independent variables 
Correlation between Price and # Generics 
MS 10 MG 30 76% MS 20 MG 30 15% 
MS 40 MG 30 51% MS 80 MG 30 51% 
MS 10 MG 90 -43% MS 20 MG 90 29% 
MS 40 MG 90 -27% MS 80 MG 90 22% 
 
Except for one form, 10 mg 30 tablets, low correlation coefficients indicate that the 
independent variables do not behave parallel, which is an evidence that there is no 
spurious regression in general. 
 
5.2.1 Testing for Autocorrelation 
 
As we are working with a time series data with a monthly frequency, we have to 
make sure that the residuals are not autocorrelated. Autocorrelated residuals can lead 
to inefficient estimates, which mean that minimum variance assumption is not 
attained. 
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Durbin-Watson test: Besides the examination of the plot of residuals, one approach 
that is frequently used to determine if serial correlation is present is the Durbin-
Watson test. It is the first formal procedure developed for testing for autocorrelation 
using the least squares residuals. The Durbin-Watson test looks directly at the first 
order autocorrelation of the residuals. High R2, t-values, F-value and a low D-W 
statistics might be a clue for the existence of an autocorrelation in the model data.  
 
The autocorrelation parameter is ρ, εt = ρ.εt-1 + vt. 
For positive autocorrelation, the hypotheses to be tested are; 
H0= ρ = 0 ? there is no positive autocorrelation 
H1= ρ > 0 ? there is positive autocorrelation 
Whereas; for negative autocorrelation, the hypotheses to be tested are; 
H0= ρ = 0 ? there is no negative autocorrelation 
H1= ρ < 0 ? there is negative autocorrelation 
 
The result of the Durbin-Watson test for both positive and negative serial 
autocorrelation is as follows; 
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Table 8: Results for testing Positive Autocorrelation 
Positive Autocorrelation 
Form Sample Size (n) Du Dl 
Durbin-
Watson 
statistics 
Result 
 10 MG 30 
47 1,62 1,43 
1,7 
DW>DU, H0 is not rejected.  
There is no positive autocorrelation. 
 20 MG 30 1,89 
DW>DU, H0 is not rejected.  
There is no positive autocorrelation. 
 40 MG 30 44 1,6 1,39 1,17 
DW<DL, H0 is rejected.  
There is positive autocorrelation. 
 80 MG 30 38 1,59 1,37 1,1 
DW<DL, H0 is rejected.  
There is positive autocorrelation. 
 10 MG 90 
26 1,55 1,22 
0,89 
DW<DL, H0 is rejected.  
There is positive autocorrelation. 
 20 MG 90 1,46 
DU>DW>DL  
No conclusion is drawn. 
 40 MG 90 0,7 
DW<DL, H0 is rejected.  
There is positive autocorrelation. 
 80 MG 90 24 1,55 1,19 0,73 
DW<DL, H0 is rejected.  
There is positive autocorrelation. 
Level of significance is 95% and # of Predictor Variables is 2. 
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Table 9: Results for Testing Negative Autocorrelation 
Negative Auto Correlation 
Form Sample  Size (n) 4 - Dl 4 - Du 
Durbin-
Watson 
statistics 
Result 
10 MG 30 
47 2,57 2,38 
1,7 
DW<4-DU, H0 is not rejected.  
 No negative autocorrelation. 
20 MG 30 1,89 
DW<4-DU, H0 is not rejected.  
 No negative autocorrelation. 
40 MG 30 1,41 
DW<4-DU, H0 is not rejected.  
 No negative autocorrelation. 
80 MG 30 38 2,63 2,41 1,1 
DW<4-DU, H0 is not rejected.  
 No negative autocorrelation. 
10 MG 90 
26 2,78 2,45 
0,89 
DW<4-DU, H0 is not rejected.  
 No negative autocorrelation. 
20 MG 90 1,25 
DW<4-DU, H0 is not rejected.  
 No negative autocorrelation. 
40 MG 90 0,7 
DW<4-DU, H0 is not rejected.  
 No negative autocorrelation. 
80 MG 90 24 2,81 2,45 0,73 
DW<4-DU, H0 is not rejected.  
 No negative autocorrelation. 
Level of significance is 95% and # of Predictor Variables is 2. 
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According to D-W test, four forms of Lipitor, 80mg 30 tabs, 10mg 90 tabs, 40mg 90 
tabs and  80mg 90 tabs, are positively autocorrelated which means the usual multiple 
linear regression assumptions do not hold, whereas for the other four forms as we 
have no evidence. Thus for the forms that the disturbances are detected to be 
autocorrelated, Newey-West estimator should be used to estimate the parameters. 
See Appendix 2 for Plot of Residuals of each form of Lipitor. 
 
5.2.2 Testing for Heteroscedasticity 
 
To employ a multiple linear regression model, it is also compulsory to test if the 
variance of the disturbances, σ2, is constant. In a regression framework, 
heteroscedasticity occurs if the variance of the error term, ε, is not constant across 
observations.  
 
White’s General Test: A simple operational version of the White’s Test is carried out 
by obtaining n.R2 in the regression of ei2 on a constant, all unique independent 
variables and all the squares and cross products of the independent variables. The 
statistic is asymptotically distributed as chi-square with P-1 degrees of freedom 
where P is the number of regressors in the equation, including the constant.  The 
hypotheses are of the form; 
H0 : σi2 = σ2 for all i, 
H1 : Not H0. 
 
For testing heteroscedasticity through White’s General Test, ordinary least squares 
residuals are regressed on a constant, P (extra co-pay), G (# of generics), P2, G2 and 
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P*G for each form of Lipitor. Using the results of the regression, White’s test 
statistics is calculated. The results of the White’s test are as follows; 
 
Table 10: Results of White’s Heteroscedasticity Test 
Heteroscedasticity 
Form R2 Sample Size (n) 
White's 
Test 
(n*R2) 
Critical 
Value of 
Chi-
Squared 
Result 
 10 MG 30 14,647% 
47 
6,884 
5,99 
Hypothesis of 
homoscedasticity  
is rejected. 
 20 MG 30 7,509% 
47 
3,529 
5,99 
Hypothesis of 
homoscedasticity  
is NOT rejected. 
 40 MG 30 15,583% 
44 
6,856 
5,99 
Hypothesis of 
homoscedasticity  
is rejected. 
 80 MG 30 7,836% 38 2,978 
5,99 
Hypothesis of 
homoscedasticity  
is NOT rejected. 
 10 MG 90 6,961% 
26 
1,810 
5,99 
Hypothesis of 
homoscedasticity  
is NOT rejected. 
 20 MG 90 33,401% 
23 
7,682 
5,99 
Hypothesis of 
homoscedasticity  
is rejected. 
 40 MG 90 46,277% 
26 
12,032 
5,99 
Hypothesis of 
homoscedasticity  
is rejected. 
 80 MG 90 24,119% 24 5,789 
5,99 
Hypothesis of 
homoscedasticity  
is NOT rejected. 
Level of significance is 95% and Degrees of Freedom (k-1) is 2. 
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According to White’s Test, four forms which are 20 mg 30 tablets, 80 mg 30 tablets, 
10 mg 90 tablets and 80 mg 30 tablets are said to be homoscedastic. The results of 
the White’s Test are consistent with our previous findings on the plot of residuals.  
 
In the presence of heteroscedasticity, the least squares estimator is still unbiased, 
consistent and asymptotically normally distributed. However, OLS is inefficient with 
certainty which is usually unknown, only then the OLS estimator is undesirable; we 
should use generalized least squares instead. If the heteroscedasticity is not 
correlated with the variables in the model, then at least in large samples, the ordinary 
least squares computations, although not the optimal way to use the data, will not be 
misleading. Thus, we have to use White heteroscedasticity consistent estimator 
where we have heteroscedasticity. See Appendix 2 for the Plot of Residuals. 
                Table 11: Summary of Autocorrelation and Heteroscedasticity Tests 
Lipitor 
Forms 
Sample 
Size Disturbances Estimator 
10 mg 30 tab 47 H/SC 
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent 
Estimator 
20 mg 30 tab 47 - Classical Linear Regression 
40 mg 30 tab 44 H/SC&A/C Newey-West Estimator 
80 mg 30 tab 38 A/C Newey-West Estimator 
10 mg 90 tab 26 A/C Newey-West Estimator 
20 mg 90 tab 23 - Classical Linear Regression 
40 mg 90 tab 26 H/SC&A/C Newey-West Estimator 
80 mg 90 tab 24 A/C Newey-West Estimator 
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To sum up, the presence of autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity makes classical 
linear regression model non-applicable to the data. However using Newey West 
estimator where we have autocorrelation and using White estimator where we have 
heteroscedasticty will be appropriate. 
 
5.3. Unit Root Tests: 
 
The purpose of unit root tests is to determine whether the time series is stationary or 
not. A unit root test tests whether a time series variable is non-stationary using an 
autoregressive model. The most famous test is the Dickey–Fuller test. 
 
Augmented Dickey–Fuller test: 
In the Dickey-Fuller test, the existence of a unit root is tested. The null hypothesis 
claims that there is no unit root, the data is stationary. For five forms which are 40 
mg 30 tablets, 80 mg 30 tablets, 10 mg 90 tablets, 20 mg 90 tablets and 40 mg 90 
tablets we cannot reject the null hypothesis that is a unit root exists. For the other 
forms, 10 mg 30 tablet, 20 mg 30 tablets and 80 mg 90 tablets we reject the 
existence of a unit root at 10% significance level.  
 
The Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistics are below zero for all forms and the 
probabilities are no greater than 50%, which can be interpreted as non-stationarity is 
not strong for any form.  
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Table 12: Unit Root Test Results 
Form 
Augmented  
Dickey-
Fuller  
test 
statistic 
Test critical values Probability Result 
1% level 5% level 10% level
10 mg 30 tab -2,683337 -3,58474 -2,92814 -2,60223 0,068 Stationary 
20 mg 30 tab -2,622274 -3,58474 -2,92814 -2,60223 0,0827 Stationary 
40 mg 30 tab -2,426483 -3,58115 -2,92662 -2,60142 0,1403 Non-stationary 
80 mg 30 tab -1,926221 -3,62678 -2,94584 -2,61153 0,317 Non-stationary 
10 mg 90 tab -1,661712 -3,72407 -2,98623 -2,6326 0,4376 Non-stationary 
20 mg 90 tab -1,609764 -3,72407 -2,98623 -2,6326 0,463 Non-stationary 
40 mg 90 tab -1,646813 -3,72407 -2,98623 -2,6326 0,4448 Non-stationary 
80 mg 90 tab -3,234768 -3,95915 -3,081 -2,68133 0,038 Stationary 
 
For the forms that we cannot reject the hypothesis that there is a unit root, we also 
tried to add a new independent variable, the value of market share in the previous 
month. However, the independent variable of lagged market share was not 
significant.  
 
Interpretation of Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation: 
 
Autocorrelation can be interpreted in two ways. First of all, the forms which we have 
evidence for autocorrelation according to Durbin-Watson test, are the ones that have 
poor variability in price. Having the strongest evidence for autocorrelation, extra co-
pay amount do not vary and may remain same for up to seven consecutive periods in 
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40 mg 90 tablet and 80 mg 90 tablet forms where sample size were 24. Moreover 
generics may attain a certain market share in time and generally raise their market 
share slowly in the beginning of their sales. Therefore the result of autocorrelation 
between the disturbances can better be understood.  
 
Moreover heteroscedasticity is also meaningful for the forms that the number of 
generics starts from zero in time frame we study. Because when a brand-name drug 
encounters a generic drug for the first time, it has a stage effect on the market share. 
Whereas, when it comes to new generics, the effect of each new one would be less 
significant when compared to the effect of previous ones mainly by two reasons; 
first the more players in the market the less the return per player would be and the 
second one is that each new generic takes market share not only from the brand-
name drug but also from other generics.  
 
Next section is the model for demand curve and corresponding solution for Lipitor 
forms according to different features of the disturbances that we detected through the 
tests we performed. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
6.1. Estimating the demand curve 
 
 
Here in this study considering the blockbuster drug Lipitor’s features and the market 
dynamics, our model is formed as follows.  
 
Dependent variable, MS, is the market share. Two independent variables are 
modeled which are expected to bring the most significant contribution to the changes 
in the market share; the number of generics in the market, G, and the amount of extra 
co-pay, P.  
 
MSi,j,t = µi,j + αi,j*Gi,j,t + βi,j*Pi,j,t + εi,j 
 
? i,j are used to imply the form of the product in milligrams and number of tablets 
respectively; i Є {10mg, 20mg, 40mg,80mg} and j Є {30tab, 90tab}. 
? A time period of 47 months are used in the model, from September 2005 to July 
2009. 
? MSi,j represents the market share of form i,j.  
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? Gi,j represents the number of generics in the market of form i,j.  
? Pi,j  represents the amount of extra co-pay of form i,j.  
? µ, α, β are the model parameters, whereas β is the price sensitivity and α is the 
sensitivity of number of generics in the market. 
 
As mentioned before, the variables price, number of generics and market share we 
observe at any time t are not necessarily at equilibrium levels. That is why we try to 
optimize. Moreover we assume demand curve is constant across different pricing 
periods.  
 
6.2 Finding the Optimal Price 
 
Firm’s Optimization Problem:   
The second part of the model is the optimization of sales revenue with respect to the 
firm’s control variable, extra co-pay. As G, the number of generics is not a firm’s 
control variable and it is given at any period, firm’s optimization problem in a given 
period is:   
Max R = (P * Q)  
With respect to P 
Subject to P ≥ 0, G > 0 
 
When trying to solve for the maximizing revenue price (P*), instead of exact quantity 
sold we can use the market share to obtain the unit sales. As we already estimated 
the model of the market share, we can transform it to the unit sales by using an 
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average unit market size, noted as M. Then the estimation for the quantity sold will 
be as follows; 
 
Q = M * MS = M (µ + α*G + β*P) 
 
Therefore for simplicity the optimization problem turns into the following problem. 
 
Max (P*M*MS) with respect to P 
Subject to P ≥ 0, G > 0 
 
As the market share is already modeled in terms of Price and # of generics, the 
maximization problem can be explored as follows; 
 
Max P * M * (µ + α * G + β *P) with respect to P 
Subject to P ≥ 0, G > 0 
 
As we are working on a linear model, the optimal Price, P*, can be explored as 
follows; 
 
∂ (Mi,j * Pi,j *µi,j + Mi,j * Pi,j * αi,j * Gi,j + Mi,j * βi,j.P*i,j2) / ∂ Pi,j *= 0 
Mi,j (µi,j + αi,j.Gi,j + 2. βi,j.P*i,j )= 0  
 
The Market Size, M is a constant and we know that it is greater than zero at any 
period. Therefore for simplicity the optimization problem may be transformed and 
then the equation of the optimal price turns into the following; 
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P*i,j = - (µi,j + αi,j.Gi,j)/2.βi,j 
 
2nd Derivative of the Objective Function:   
 
For a twice-differentiable function f, if the second derivative, f ′′(x) is negative (or, if 
the acceleration is negative), then the graph is concave. The concavity of the 
objective function, f (Pi,j, Gi,j),  is shown by taking the second derivative of the 
objective function.  
 
f ′′(Pi,j, Gi,j) = ∂2 (M * Pi,j * µi,j + M * Pi,j * αi,j * Gi,j + M * βi,j * Pi,j2) / ∂ Pi,j2 
f ′′(Pi,j, Gi,j) = 2*M*βi,j 
 
We know that the market size M is greater than zero at any t. Then the objective 
function is concave if and only if βi,j ≤ 0. Under the assumption of concavity, 
revenue function can then be optimized only by taking the first derivative with 
respect to price. 
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6.3 Estimation & Empirical Results 
 
According to the results of autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity tests, in this 
section each form of Lipitor is solved by using necessary estimators. For 
homoscedastic and non-autocorrelated forms we used the classical linear regression 
model, whereas for the forms that we detect heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation or 
both, we used White’s Heteroscedasticity consistent estimator, Newey-West 
estimator and again Newey-West estimator respectively. See Table 8-11 for the 
results of analysis regarding disturbances. 
 
Model for Demand Curve Estimation: 
The model for “market share” of Lipitor i mg j tablets form was as follows in 
general: 
MSi,j = µi,j + αi,j*Gi,j + β i,j*Pi,j + εi,j 
 
Firm’s Maximizing Revenue Problem: 
After estimating the demand curve, as shown before we set the firm’s maximizing 
revenue problem in the following form:  
Max Pi,j * Mi,j * (µi,j + αi,j * Gi,j + βi,j *Pi,j)  
With respect to Pi,j  
Subject to Pi,j ≥ 0, Gi,j > 0 
 
Making sure that β i,j ≤ 0, we know that the objective function is concave. Then, the 
optimal price was calculated as; 
P*i,j = - (µi,j + αi,j.Gi,j)/2.βi,j 
53 
 
In the following sections all forms of Lipitor are solved one by one.  
6.3.1. Lipitor 10 mg 30 tablet: 
 
The disturbances of Lipitor 10 mg 30 tablets were detected to be heteroscedastic. 
Therefore we used White’s Heteroskedasticity Consistent Estimator. Table 13 and 
Figure 11 show the E-views results of the regression analysis. 
 
The model and the model parameters are estimated as follows; 
• Price sensitivity ? β10mg,30tab = -0.019 
• # of generics sensitivity ? α 10mg,30tab = -0.009 
• Estimation ? ms10mg,30tab = 0.401 - 0.009*g10mg,30tab - 0.019*p10mg,30tab  
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Table 13: Regression Output for Lipitor 10 mg 30 Tablets 
Dependent Variable: MS1030   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 09/12/09   Time: 21:14   
Sample: 2005M09 2009M07   
Included observations: 47   
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance 
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 0.401111 0.017400 23.05223 0.0000 
P1030 -0.019275 0.004782 -4.030611 0.0002 
G1030 -0.008648 0.002120 -4.079613 0.0002 
R-squared 0.749188     Mean dependent var 0.264475 
Adjusted R-squared 0.737788     S.D. dependent var 0.053820 
S.E. of regression 0.027559     Akaike info criterion 
-
4.283245 
Sum squared resid 0.033419     Schwarz criterion 
-
4.165150 
Log likelihood 103.6563     Hannan-Quinn criter. 
-
4.238805 
F-statistic 65.71513     Durbin-Watson stat 1.703030 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Accordingly revenue function (Q * P) to be maximized is estimated to be as follows; 
Max M*(0.401*P10mg,30tab - 0.009*G10mg,30tab*P10mg,30tab - 0.019*P10mg,30tab2) 
with respect to P 
Subject to P ≥ 0, G > 0 
 
Here β10mg,30tab = -0.019 ≤ 0 guarantees the concavity of the objective function, 
which then can be solved by taking the first derivative. Figure 12 is the graph of our 
concave objective function. The function is decreasing by G, # of generics, and first 
increasing up to a certain level, up to the optimal price, and then start decreasing by 
P, extra co-pay amount.  
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Figure 11: Graph of Residuals and Regression for Lipitor 10 mg 30 Tablets 
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Figure 12  – Graph of the Objective Function for Lipitor 10 mg 30 Tablets 
 
Then optimal price is solved as follows; 
P*i,j = - (µi,j + αi,j.Gi,j)/2.βi,j 
P*= - (0.401 - 0.009*G10mg,30tab,t)/(2*-0.019) 
 
As the number of generics in the “10 miligrams 30 tablets” market currently is 14, 
the optimum price P* equals; 
P* = 7.235 TL 
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6.3.2. Lipitor 20 mg 30 tablet: 
 
Lipitor 20 mg 30 tablets, provides the necessary assumptions of the Classical Linear 
Regression Model. Table 12 and Figure 13 show the E-views results of the 
regression analysis for Lipitor 20 mg 30 tablets. 
  
Table 14: Regression Output for Lipitor 20 mg 30 Tablets 
Dependent Variable: MS_20_MG_30  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 09/09/09   Time: 23:37   
Sample: 2005M09 2009M07   
Included observations: 47   
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 0.383647 0.012707 30.19294 0.0000 
PRICE -0.012861 0.001937 -6.640981 0.0000 
__GENERICS -0.015571 0.001157 -13.45505 0.0000 
R-squared 0.854332     Mean dependent var 0.193540 
Adjusted R-squared 0.847711     S.D. dependent var 0.056393 
S.E. of regression 0.022007     Akaike info criterion 
-
4.733211 
Sum squared resid 0.021310     Schwarz criterion 
-
4.615116 
Log likelihood 114.2305     Hannan-Quinn criter. 
-
4.688771 
F-statistic 129.0283     Durbin-Watson stat 1.886097 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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The model and the model parameters are estimated as follows; 
• Price sensitivity ? β20mg,30tab = -0.013 
• # of generics sensitivity ? α20mg,30tab = -0.016 
• Estimation ? ms20mg,30tab,t = 0.384 - 0.016*g 20mg,30tab,t - 0.013*p 20mg,30tab,t  
 
 
Figure 11 – Graph of Residuals, Actual and Fitted Line 
 
Revenue function (Q * P) to be maximized is estimated to be as follows; 
Max M * (0.384*P20mg,30tab,t - 0.016*G20mg,30tab,t*P20mg,30tab,t - 0.013*P20mg,30tab,t2) 
with respect to P 
Subject to P ≥ 0, G > 0 
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Figure 13: Graph of Resid ls, Actual and Fitted Line 
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Here β20mg,30tab = -0.013 ≤ 0 guarantees the concavity of the objective function. 
Figure 14 is the graph of our concave objective function.  
 
Figure 14  – Graph of the Objective Function for Lipitor 20 mg 30 Tablets 
 
Then optimal price is solved as follows; 
P*i,j = - (µi,j + αi,j.Gi,j)/2.βi,j 
P*= - (0.384 - 0.016*G20mg,30tab,t)/(2*-0.013) 
 
As number of generics in the “20 miligrams 30 tablets” market is 14, the optimum 
price P* equals; 
P* = 6.159 TL 
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6.3.3. Lipitor 40 mg 30 tablets: 
 
Lipitor 40 mg 30 tablets form is detected to be both heteroscedastic and 
autocorrelated. Therefore we used Newey-West Estimator. Table 15 and Figure 15 
show the E-views results of the regression analysis for Lipitor 40 mg 30 tablets. 
 
The model and the model parameters are estimated to be as follows; 
• Price sensitivity ? β40mg,30tab = -0.009 
• # of generics sensitivity ? α40mg,30tab = -0.012 
• Estimation ? ms40mg,30tab,t = 0.309 - 0.012*g 40mg,30tab,t - 0.009*p 40mg,30tab,t  
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Figure 15: Graph of Residuals, Actual and Fitted Line 
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Table 15: Regression Output for Lipitor 40 mg 30 tablets 
Dependent Variable: MS4030  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 09/12/09   Time: 21:24   
Sample: 2005M09 2009M07   
Included observations: 44   
Newey-West HAC Standard Errors & Covariance (lag truncation=3) 
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 0.308833 0.019953 15.47773 0.0000 
P4030 -0.009193 0.003386 -2.714733 0.0097 
G4030 -0.012079 0.001622 -7.445667 0.0000 
R-squared 0.779044     Mean dependent var 0.171039 
Adjusted R-squared 0.768266     S.D. dependent var 0.045824 
S.E. of regression 0.022059     Akaike info criterion 4.724427 
Sum squared resid 0.019951     Schwarz criterion 4.602778 
Log likelihood 106.9374     Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.679313 
F-statistic 72.27859     Durbin-Watson stat 1.171985 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
 
Accordingly revenue function (Q * P) to be maximized is estimated to be as follows; 
Max M*(0.309*P40mg,30tab,t - 0.012*G40mg,30tab,t*P40mg,30tab,t - 0.009*P40mg,30tab,t2) 
with respect to P 
Subject to P ≥ 0, G > 0 
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Here β40mg,30tab = -0.009 ≤ 0, guarantees the concavity of the objective function is.  
Figure 16 is the graph of our concave objective function.  
  
Figure 16  – Graph of the objective function for Lipitor 20 mg 30 tablets 
 
Then optimal price is solved as follows; 
P*i,j = - (µi,j + αi,j.Gi,j)/2.βi,j 
P40mg,30tab,t *= - (0.309 - 0.012*G40mg,30tab,t)/(2*-0.009) 
 
As number of generics in the “40 miligrams 30 tablets” market is 14, the optimum 
price P* equals; 
P*= 7.829 TL 
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6.3.4. Lipitor 10 mg 90 tablets: 
 
The disturbances of Lipitor 10 mg 90 tablets form are detected to be autocorrelated. 
Therefore we used Newey-West Estimator. Table 16 and Figure 17 show the E-
views results of the regression analysis for Lipitor 10 mg 90 tablets. 
 
The model and the model parameters are estimated to be as follows; 
• Price sensitivity ? β10mg,90tab = -0.022 
• # of generics sensitivity ? α 10mg,90tab = -0.034 
• Estimation ? ms10mg,90tab = 0.812 - 0.034*g10mg,90tab - 0.022*p10mg,90tab  
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Figure 17: Graph of Residuals, Actual and Fitted Line 
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Table 16: Regression Output for Lipitor 10 mg 90 tablets 
Dependent Variable: MS_10_MG_90  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 09/12/09   Time: 13:01   
Sample: 2007M06 2009M07   
Included observations: 26   
Newey-West HAC Standard Errors & Covariance (lag truncation=2) 
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 0.812428 0.027552 29.48738 0.0000 
PRICE -0.021960 0.011546 -1.901997 0.0698 
__GENERICS -0.033568 0.002945 -11.39680 0.0000 
R-squared 0.830047     Mean dependent var 0.618682 
Adjusted R-squared 0.815268     S.D. dependent var 0.134618 
S.E. of regression 0.057859     Akaike info criterion 2.753439 
Sum squared resid 0.076997     Schwarz criterion 2.608274 
Log likelihood 38.79471     Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.711637 
F-statistic 56.16566     Durbin-Watson stat 0.893018 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
 
 
Accordingly revenue function (Q * P) to be maximized is estimated to be as follows; 
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Max M*(0.812*P10mg,90tab,t - 0.034*G10mg,90tab,t*P10mg,90tab,t - 0.022*P10mg,90tab,t2) 
with respect to P 
Subject to P ≥ 0, G > 0 
 
Here β10mg,90tab = -0.022 ≤ 0, guarantees the concavity of the objective function. 
Figure 18 is the graph of our concave objective function.  
 
Figure 18  – Graph of the objective function for Lipitor 10 mg 90 tablets 
 
Then optimal price is solved as follows; 
P*i,j = - (µi,j + αi,j.Gi,j)/2.βi,j 
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P*= - (0.812 - 0.034*G10mg,90tab,t)/(2*-0.022) 
As the number of generics in the “10 miligrams 90 tablets” market is currently 10, 
the optimum price P* equals; 
P*= 10.725 TL 
6.3.5. Lipitor 20 mg 90 tablets: 
 
Lipitor 20 mg 90 tablets form provides the necessary assumptions of the Classical 
Linear Regression Model. Table 17 and Figure 19 show the E-views results of the 
regression analysis for Lipitor 20 mg 90 tablets. 
Table 17: Regression Output for Lipitor 20 mg 90 tablets 
Dependent Variable: MS2090  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 09/12/09   Time: 21:51   
Included observations: 23 after adjustments  
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 0.775946 0.020186 38.44028 0.0000 
P2090 0.011983 0.007225 -1.658597 0.1128 
G2090 0.037123 0.003101 -11.96967 0.0000 
R-squared 0.892232     Mean dependent var 0.559710 
Adjusted R-squared 0.881455     S.D. dependent var 0.155302 
S.E. of regression 0.053471     Akaike info criterion 2.898247 
Sum squared resid 0.057183     Schwarz criterion 2.750139 
Log likelihood 36.32984     Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.860998 
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F-statistic 82.79167     Durbin-Watson stat 1.458205 
The model and the model parameters are estimated to be as follows; 
• Price sensitivity ? β20mg,90tab = -0.012 at 88% level of significance. 
• # of generics sensitivity ? α 20mg,90tab = -0.037 
• Estimation ? ms20mg,90tab = 0.776 - 0.037*g20mg,90tab - 0.012*p20mg,90tab  
 
 
 
 
Accordingly revenue function (Q * P) to be maximized is estimated to be as follows; 
Max M*(0.776*P20mg,90tab,t - 0.037*G20mg,90tab,t*P20mg,90tab,t - 0.012*P20mg,90tab,t2) 
with respect to P 
Subject to P ≥ 0, G > 0 
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Figure 19: Graph of Residuals, Actual and Fitted Line 
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Here β20mg,90tab = -0.012 ≤ 0, guarantees the concavity of the objective function. 
Figure 20 is the graph of our concave objective function.  
 
Figure 20  – Graph of the objective function for Lipitor 20 mg 90 tablets 
 
Then optimal price is solved as follows; 
P*i,j = - (µi,j + αi,j.Gi,j)/2.βi,j 
P20mg,90tab,t *= - (0.776 - 0.037*G20mg,90tab,t)/(2*-0.012) 
 
As the number of generics in the “20 miligrams 90 tablets” market is currently 10, 
the optimum price P* equals; 
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P20mg,90tab* = 16.913 TL 
 
6.3.6. Lipitor 80 mg 30 tablets: 
 
80 mg 30 tablet form is detected to be autocorrelated. Therefore we used Newey-
West Estimator. Table 18 and Figure 21 show the E-views results of the regression 
analysis for Lipitor 20 mg 90 tablets. 
Table 18: Regression Output for Lipitor 10 mg 90 tablets 
Dependent Variable: MS_80_MG_30  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 09/12/09   Time: 12:54   
Sample: 2006M06 2009M07   
Included observations: 38   
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 1.004101 0.030746 32.65831 0.0000 
PRICE 0.008201 0.009231 0.888425 0.3804 
__GENERICS -0.134129 0.009331 -14.37376 0.0000 
R-squared 0.895546     Mean dependent var 0.538666 
Adjusted R-squared 0.889578     S.D. dependent var 0.240806 
S.E. of regression 0.080020     Akaike info criterion 2.137435 
Sum squared resid 0.224109     Schwarz criterion 2.008152 
Log likelihood 43.61127     Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.091437 
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F-statistic 150.0384     Durbin-Watson stat 1.100283 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
 
The model and the model parameters are estimated to be as follows; 
• Price sensitivity ? β80mg,30tab is not significant. 
• # of generics sensitivity ? α 80mg,30tab = -0.134 
• Estimation ? ms80mg,30tab = 0.776 - 0.037*g80mg,30tab - 0.012*p80mg,30tab  
 
 
 
 
The independent variable extra co-pay amount is not significant in the regression. 
That is why the firm’s optimization problem is not solved.  
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Figure 21: Graph of Residuals, Actual and Fitted Line 
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6.3.7. Lipitor 40 mg 90 tablets: 
 
The disturbances of 40 mg 90 tablets form are detected to be both heteroscedastic 
and autocorrelated. We used Newey-West Estimator in our model. Table 19 and 
Figure 22 show the E-views results of the regression analysis for Lipitor 20 mg 90 
tablets. 
Table 19: Regression Output for Lipitor 40 mg 90 tablets 
Dependent Variable: MS4090   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 09/12/09   Time: 22:11   
Sample (adjusted): 2007M06 2009M07  
Included observations: 26 after adjustments  
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 0.744467 0.035480 20.98264 0.0000 
P4090 -0.003899 0.014398 -0.270809 0.7890 
G4090 -0.036841 0.004491 -8.203456 0.0000 
R-squared 0.806193     Mean dependent var 0.564071 
Adjusted R-squared 0.789340     S.D. dependent var 0.157265 
S.E. of regression 0.072181     Akaike info criterion 2.311110 
Sum squared resid 0.119833     Schwarz criterion 2.165945 
Log likelihood 33.04442     Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.269307 
F-statistic 47.83732     Durbin-Watson stat 0.703831 
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The model and the model parameters are estimated to be as follows; 
• Price sensitivity ? β80mg,30tab is not significant. 
• # of generics sensitivity ? α 80mg,30tab = -0.134 
• Estimation ? ms80mg,30tab = 0.776 - 0.037*g80mg,30tab - 0.012*p80mg,30tab 
 
 
 
 
Similarly the independent variable extra co-pay amount is not significant for Lipitor 
40 mg 90 tablets. That is why the firm’s optimization problem is not solved.  
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6.3.8. Lipitor 80 mg 90 tablets: 
 
The disturbances of 80 mg 90 tablets form are detected to be autocorrelated. We 
used Newey-West Estimator in our model. Table 20 and Figure 23 show the E-views 
results of the regression analysis for Lipitor 20 mg 90 tablets. 
                       Table 20: Regression Output for Lipitor 40 mg 90 tablets 
Dependent Variable: MS8090   
Method: Least Squares   
Included observations: 24 after adjustments  
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 0.393868 0.076497 5.148824 0.0000 
P8090 0.010764 0.010157 1.059735 0.3013 
G8090 0.011909 0.028193 0.422406 0.6770 
R-squared 0.119047     Mean dependent var 0.440734 
Adjusted R-squared 0.035146     S.D. dependent var 0.117840 
S.E. of regression 0.115750     Akaike info criterion -1.358294 
Sum squared resid 0.281361     Schwarz criterion -1.211037 
Log likelihood 19.29952     Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.319226 
F-statistic 1.418905     Durbin-Watson stat 0.734594 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.264244    
              
 
The regression for Lipitor 80 mg 30 tablets is not significant. 
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Figure 11 – Graph of Residuals, Actual and Fitted Line 
 
The model for Lipitor 80 mg 90 tablets form is not significant. That is why the 
firm’s optimization problem is not solved.  
 
6.4. Estimating the Price Elasticity 
 
To model the consumer choices between original and generic drugs under the 
influence of additional co-payment, estimating the price elasticity is a key issue. 
Elasticity of demand is a measure of responsiveness of buyers to changes in price. It 
is defined as the percentage change in the quantity demanded divided by the 
percentage change in price.  
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Figure 23: Graph of Residuals, Actual and Fitted Line 
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The price elasticity is estimated after log-transformation of the variables. The model 
to estimate price elasticity is as follows: 
 
Log (100*MSi,j ) = λi,j + γi,j* Log Gi,j + δi,j* Log Pi,j + νi,j 
δi,j ? The price elasticity of Lipitor i mg and j tablets, 
γi,j ? The elasticity of the number of generics in the market. 
 
For the forms of Lipitor the elasticities are estimated to be as follows:  
 
Elasticity for Lipitor 10 mg 30 tablets: 
Log (100*MS10,30)= 1,776 – 0,326 * Log G10,30 – 0,125 * Log P10,30 
The price elasticity δ10,30 and the elasticity of the number of generics γ10,30 are 
estimated to be -0,125 and -0,326 respectively.  
 
Elasticity for Lipitor 20 mg 30 tablets: 
Log (100*MS20,30)= 2,121 – 0,855 * Log G20,30 – 0,054 * Log P20,30 
The price elasticity δ20,30 and the elasticity of the number of generics γ20,30 are 
estimated to be -0,054 and -0,855 respectively. 
 
Elasticity for Lipitor 40 mg 30 tablets: 
Log (100*MS40,30)= 1,960 – 0,742 * Log G40,30 – 0,029 * Log P40,30 
The price elasticity δ40,30 and the elasticity of the number of generics γ40,30 are 
estimated to be -0,029 and -0,742 respectively. 
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Elasticity for Lipitor 10 mg 90 tablets: 
Log (100*MS10,90)= 1,880 – 0,246 * Log G10,90 – 0,046 * Log P10,90 
The price elasticity δ10,90 and the elasticity of the number of generics γ10,90 are 
estimated to be -0,046 and -0,246 respectively. 
 
Elasticity for Lipitor 20 mg 90 tablets: 
Log (100*MS20,90)= 1,849 – 0,256 * Log G20,90 – 0,028 * Log P20,90 
The price elasticity δ20,90 and the elasticity of the number of generics γ20,90 are 
estimated to be -0,028 and -0,256 respectively. 
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                                                CHAPTER 7 
 
FINDINGS 
 
 
 
 
According to the results of the regression analysis, the model is significant for seven 
forms. The “number of generics” is a significant variable for seven forms whereas 
the “extra co-pay amount” is a significant variable for five forms among eight forms 
of Lipitor.  
 
Table 21 is a summary for the results of the regression analysis explained in detail in 
the previous chapter. 
 
For 10 mg 30 tablets, 20 mg 30 tablets, 40 mg 30 tablets, 10 mg 90 tablets and 20 
mg 90 tablets forms; the models are significant. The R-squared values changes 
between 75% and 89% which means the changes in the market share can be 
explained by price variation and number of generics in the market to a large extent.  
 
Independent variable P is significant for five forms, which indicates that the 
consumer choices from brand-name drug to generics are triggered under the 
influence of extra co-pay.  
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                                                     Table 21: Summary of Results 
Lipitor  
Forms 
R-
squared 
Model  
Significance 
Significance  
of  
Variable, P 
Price 
Sensitivity, 
β 
Significance 
of  
Variable, G 
# of 
generics 
sensitivity, 
α 
10mg 
30tab 
75% Significant Significant -0,019 Significant -0,009 
20mg 
30tab 
85% Significant Significant -0,013 Significant -0,016 
40mg 
30tab 
78% Significant Significant -0,009 Significant -0,012 
80mg 
30tab 
90% Significant Insignificant -0,008 Significant -0,134 
10mg 
90tab 
81% Significant Significant -0,022 Significant -0,034 
20mg 
90tab 
89% Significant 
Sign at 
α=88% 
-0,012 Significant -0,037 
40mg 
90tab 
81% Significant Insignificant -0,004 Significant -0,037 
80mg 
90tab 
12% Insignificant Insignificant -0,011 Insignificant -0,012 
 
 
The negative coefficients are meaningful in the market dynamics as we observe in 
real life that presence of generics decrease the market share of the brand-name drug 
and higher extra co-pay increase the switch rate and thus again decrease the market 
share.  
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The maximizing revenue objective function is decreasing by G, # of generics, and 
first increasing up to a certain level, up to the optimal price, and then start 
decreasing by P, extra co-pay amount.  
 
The optimal prices change between 6 and 16 TL. Table 22 is a summary for the 
results of the firm’s optimization problem. 
 
Table 22: Summary of Results for Optimal Price 
Lipitor 
Forms 
R-
squared 
Model  
Significance 
Price 
Sensitivity, β 
Objective 
Function 
Optimal  
Price (TL)
10mg 
30tab 75% Significant Negative Concave 7,2 
20mg 
30tab 85% Significant Negative Concave 6,2 
40mg 
30tab 78% Significant Negative Concave 7,8 
10mg 
90tab 81% Significant Negative Concave 10,7 
20mg 
90tab 89% Significant Negative Concave 16,9 
 
 
The extra co-pay amount is not a significant factor for forms 80 mg 30 tablets and 40 
mg 90 tablets. The regression is not significant for 80 mg 90 tablets form. For these 
forms, the sales are not high and generic competition is not as intense as other forms. 
The data set did not provide fruitful information and much variation for our model. 
For these forms the optimal price is not solved.  
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Table 23 presents the elasticities of Lipitor forms. The value of price elasticity of the 
market share implies that 1 percent increase in extra co-pay leads δi,j percent 
decrease in market share, which is a valuable information.  
                          Table 23: The Price and Number of Generics Elasticity 
Lipitor Forms Price Elasticity, δ 
Number of 
Generics 
Elasticity, γ 
10mg 30tab -0,125 -0,326 
20mg 30tab -0,054 -0,855 
40mg 30tab -0,029 -0,742 
10mg 90tab -0,046 -0,246 
20mg 90tab -0,028 -0,256 
 
 
Market share changes in response to the changes in prices. For all forms γi,j ≥ δi,j, 
which means the number of generics is more effective than the extra co-pay amount 
on the changes in market share. The form which market share affects by extra co-
payment most is Lipitor 10 mg 30 tablets. A 1 percent increase in the “number of 
generics in the market” leads a 0,125 percent decrease in market share for Lipitor 10 
mg 30 tablets form. 
 
The results of the example regression models verify our doubts of the effect of an 
additional co-payment on the market share of the drug. The presence of generics in 
the market and additional co-pay amounts are both significant on the sales 
performance of the drug and it is possible for the firm to estimate the price 
sensitivity. Accordingly firm can maximize revenue by setting price optimally.  
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                                                         CHAPTER 8 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
Parallel to the changes in the Global Pharmaceutical Market; in Turkey it is also 
subject to a material tendency in curtailment in health expenditures through mainly 
two important instruments; increasing genericization and policy changes regarding 
pricing and reimbursement. The aim of this thesis is to answer some important 
questions that emerge in this challenging environment especially for brand-name 
drug firms. We try to model the demand function through a simple application for an 
example drug, named Lipitor. According to the estimation for the demand function, 
we investigate the significance of the effect of “extra co-pay” on patients and 
estimate the price elasticity. Then we solved the firm’s optimization problem which 
maximizes revenue subject to the firm’s only control variable, extra co-pay.  
 
According to the results of our model, among all the factors that may affect market 
share, the most significant ones were the number of generics in the market and extra 
co-pay. The results verified our observations in real life that the patients tend to 
substitute from brand-name drugs to generic ones in case of the existence of 
additional extra co-pay. Our model results infer that the increase in extra co-payment 
amount leads a significant decrease in the market share of the drugs.  
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Although firms are trying to zero this co-payment amounts by lowering their prices, 
our findings for the forms of Lipitor imply that the loss which comes with the 
decrease in price cannot be compensated with the increase in the market share. 
Moreover the results imply that the revenue maximizing extra co-payment amounts 
are between 6 and 17 TL. 
 
One of the limitations of this study is that the data set covers only a few years and 
provides us a maximum 47 observation with a monthly frequency. For a longer data 
set, the demand curve can be estimated more precisely. In addition there is another 
limitation regarding the data set; the lack of variability in the independent variables. 
Especially for the forms that extra co-payment is not significant; the number of 
generics and the amount of extra co-pay may remain unchanged for consecutive few 
periods. The higher the variability of the independent variables the better the 
regression fit.  
 
For future research the next steps are employing more complex models. This study 
takes the market share static and optimizes accordingly. Yet it can be modeled and 
solved for maximizing the long term revenue instead of optimizing only one period. 
Plus the demand curve estimation can be studied for other drugs that face intense 
generic competition and high extra co-pay with a larger data set.  
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APPENDIX 1 
 
 
Plot of Residuals 
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APPENDIX 2 
 
Summary Statistics 
 
 
Variable  Mean  Median  Maximum  Minimum  Std. Dev.  Skewness  Kurtosis 
MS1030 0,264475  0,258535  0,396096  0,181676  0,053820  0,329570  2,160384
P1030 2,304149  2,370000  5,450000  0,320000  1,299760  0,253107  2,533522
G1030  10,66383  12,00000  14,00000  6,000000  2,840807 -0,586277  1,836679
MS2030  0,193540  0,192262  0,320233  0,104163  0,056393  0,162705  1,947581
P2030  1,919362  2,300000  5,720000  0,000000  1,694943  0,355939  1,974751
G2030  10,62340  12,00000  14,00000  6,000000  2,836349 -0,561098  1,793027
MS4030  0,171039  0,157231  0,249578  0,105186  0,045824  0,292416  1,730877
P4030  0,959318  0,660000  3,560000  0,000000  0,953250  0,882857  2,822870
G4030  10,67727  12,00000  14,00000  6,000000  2,934864 -0,534306  1,683467
MS8030  0,538666  0,409021  0,995396  0,274791  0,240806  0,532868  1,706454
P8030  4,148158  4,240000  9,230000  0,000000  1,878993  0,062199  3,559724
G8030  3,723684  5,000000  5,000000  0,500000  1,754136 -0,755852  1,736138
MS1090  0,618682  0,619535  0,876238  0,396599  0,134618 -0,078845  1,951364
P1090  1,038462  1,540000  4,050000  0,000000  1,001466  0,818912  3,943634
G1090  5,092308  6,000000  10,00000  0,500000  3,887716  0,052974  1,304842
MS2090  0,559710  0,541119  0,797520  0,314691  0,155302  0,115246  1,834861
P2090  0,763913  0,000000  7,170000  0,000000  1,627091  2,937783  11,65593
G2090  5,578261  6,300000  10,00000  1,000000  3,790413 -0,128671  1,376380
MS4090  0,564071  0,562572  0,857509  0,312094  0,157265  0,070378  2,070952
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P4090  0,967692  0,005000  4,150000  0,000000  1,420556  1,166104  2,834726
G4090  4,794231  4,250000  10,00000  0,500000  3,870616  0,265917  1,376220
MS8090  0,440734  0,456744  0,685051  0,268813  0,117840  0,116801  2,073247
P8090  2,049167  0,605000  11,03000  0,000000  3,296429  1,804722  5,205902
G8090  2,083333  2,000000  4,000000  1,000000  1,138904  0,557027  1,903218
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Variable 
Jarque-
Bera Probability Sum 
Sum Sq. 
Dev. Observations 
MS1030  2,231362  0,327692  12,43033  0,133243  47 
P1030  0,927966  0,628774  108,2950  77,71132  47 
G1030  5,342725  0,069158  501,2000  371,2285  47 
MS2030  2,376394  0,304770  9,096383  0,146288  47 
P2030  3,050900  0,217523  90,21000  132,1503  47 
G2030  5,319041  0,069982  499,3000  370,0643  47 
MS4030  3,579954  0,166964  7,525728  0,090294  44 
P4030  5,773385  0,055760  42,21000  39,07348  44 
G4030  5,271185  0,071676  469,8000  370,3773  44 
MS8030  4,447673  0,108193  20,46933  2,145539  38 
P8030  0,520545  0,770841  157,6300  130,6328  38 
G8030  6,147441  0,046249  141,5000  113,8487  38 
MS1090  1,218212  0,543837  16,08574  0,453048  26 
P1090  3,870657  0,144377  27,00000  25,07334  26 
G1090  3,125186  0,209592  132,4000  377,8585  26 
MS2090  1,351897  0,508674  12,87333  0,530610  23 
P2090  104,8871  0,000000  17,57000  58,24335  23 
G2090  2,589767  0,273930  128,3000  316,0791  23 
MS4090  0,956522  0,619860  14,66583  0,618308  26 
P4090  5,922057  0,051766  25,16000  50,44946  26 
G4090  3,162803  0,205687  124,6500  374,5416  26 
MS8090  0,913442  0,633357  10,57763  0,319382  24 
P8090  17,89409  0,000130  49,18000  249,9282  24 
G8090  2,444048  0,294633  50,00000  29,83333  24 
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APPENDIX 3 
 
Modeling Assumptions 
 
 
The assumptions of the Classical Linear Regression Model were; (Greene 2003) 
A1. Linearity: The model specifies a linear relationship between the regressand and 
the regressors. √ 
A2. Full Rank: To estimate the model parameters, there should be no exact linear 
relationship among any of the independent variables in the model. √ 
A3. Exogeneity of the independent variables: E[εi | xj,1, xj,1 ,…, xj,1]=0. Expected 
value of the disturbance at any observation in the sample is not a function of the 
independent variables. The independent variables carry no useful information for 
prediction of εi. √ 
A4. Homoscedasticity and Nonautocorrelation: Each disturbance, εi, has the same 
finite variance, σ2 and is uncorrelated with every other disturbance, εj.  
A5. Exogenously Generated Data: As the analysis is done conditionally on the 
observed X’s, it is very important that the data set should be exogenously generated, 
for interpreting the results of the model correctly. √ 
A6. Normal Distribution: The disturbances are normally distributed. √ 
 
